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Since 1974, when Arthur B. Laffer first drew his famous curve on a
napkin in a Washington restaurant, there has been considerable public
debate about the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates
and government revenue. Pictured in figure 10.1, the Laffer curve plots
total revenue against the tax rate and claims to show that two rates exist at
which a given revenue can be collected. The tax rate of figure 10.1
generally refers to any particular tax instrument, while revenues gener-
ally refer to total tax receipts. An increase in the payroll tax rate, for
example, could affect not only its own revenue, but work effort and thus
personal income tax revenues.
The upward-sloping portion of the curve is called the "normal" range
and the downward-sloping segment is the "prohibitive" range. No ra-
tional government would knowingly operate on the latter range in the
long run, because the same revenue could be obtained with a lower tax
rate. However, with adjustment lags in the private sector and a high
social discount rate, such tax rates might be used in the short run. The
prohibitive range is said to exist because the high tax rates stifle economic
activity, force agents to barter, and encourage leisure pursuits.
The debate has been conducted mostly in the spheres of politics and
journalism, and it includes a wide variety of unsupported claims and
opinions. These range all the way from the assertion that the prohibitive
range does not exist to the claim that "we are well within this range at
This chapter is a revised version of an article by Don Fullerton, "On the possibility of an
inverse relationship between tax rates and government revenues," Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 19 (October 1982): 3-22. Reproduced by permission.
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Fig. 10.1 The Laffer curve.
present."
1 Simple theoretical models can show that the prohibitive range
does indeed exist, but the U.S. position on the curve is clearly an
empirical matter. Despite the obvious importance of this issue for fiscal
policy, no serious estimation of the curve, using an economic model, has
been made.
2
Our original equilibrium model is well suited to answering questions
related to the Laffer curve. First, we can attempt to determine where on
the Laffer curve the United States economy is today, and we can get an
idea of the shape of the entire curve. Second, we can learn about the
relationship between the curve and critical parameters, such as the elas-
ticities of supply of factor inputs.
3
In the next section we offer a brief review of some salient points from
the debate. A common aspect of previous studies is that a prohibitive
range for some local or national economy is always associated with
particularly high tax rates, high factor supply elasticities, or both. In
section 10.3 we establish the conditions under which a lower tax rate
1. Michael Kinsley (1978) correctly claims that there is no logical necessity for revenues
to be zero at 100 percent tax rates, due to nonmonetary incentives for work effort, but he
incorrectly infers that "there's no logical reason to assume without proof that the Laffer
curve ever reverses direction at all" (p. 38). Laffer (1980) points out that even if a motivated
person still works with a 100 percent tax rate, there must be some higher rate that will make
him stop. The curve will still have the shape of figure 10.1. The quote in the text is from
Laffer 1977, p. 79.
2. Several papers have described models in which there exists the possibility of a
prohibitive range. See Canto, Joines, and Laffer 1978 and Beck 1979 for examples. Other
empirical papers have found governments operating in this range, as seen in the next
section. Also, Kiefer (1978) provides estimates of revenue effects from the DRI, Wharton,
and Chase Econometric models. None of these papers plot out the Laffer curve, however,
nor do they estimate its relationship to various elasticity parameters.
3. In general, the location of the curve depends on both supply and demand elasticities,
consumption and production parameters, and other circumstances in the economy. In
wartime, for example, individuals might be willing to work harder at high tax rates to
generate larger tax revenues.190 Chapter Ten
could result in higher revenues. These conditions are summarized in a
new curve, plotting the appropriate factor supply elasticity against the tax
rate. In section 10.4 we use the model to estimate the position of the
Laffer curve for various values of the labor supply elasticity. We also plot
the combinations of labor supply elasticities and tax rates that put the
economy on the boundary between the normal range and the prohibitive
range.
10.2 A Brief Literature Review
The idea of an inverse relationship between tax rates and revenue is not
entirely new. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith could hardly be
more explicit: "High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of
the taxed commodities, and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, fre-
quently afford a smaller revenue to government than what might be
drawn from more moderate taxes" ([1776] 1976, 5:414).
The trade literature, as exemplified by Caves and Jones (1973), has
always understood the existence of a revenue-maximizing tariff. This
pre-Laffer edition contains a hump-shaped tariff revenue curve that looks
just like figure 10.1. With respect to internal taxes, Jules Dupuit in 1844
states: "By thus gradually increasing the tax it will reach a level at which
the yield is at a maximum . . . Beyond, the yield of tax diminishes. . . .
Lastly a tax [which is prohibitive] will yield nothing" (1969, pp. 281-82).
Recent literature has examined this relationship more closely. Canto,
Joines, and Laffer (1978) build a simple equilibrium model with one
output, two factors, and a labor/leisure choice on the part of a single
consumer group. Their utility function includes discounted consumption
and leisure of each future period—a formulation very similar to our
larger empirical general equilibrium model. Another similarity is that
capital is inelastically supplied in any one period, but can grow over time.
Labor taxes in these models place a wedge between the wage paid by
producers and net wage received by workers. Individuals react to this
wedge with an income effect and a substitution effect. In their model,
however, government revenues are returned through transfers or are
used to buy goods that are perfect substitutes for private goods. This
modeling cancels out the income effect and leaves the economy with an
unambiguously positive substitution effect and an upward-sloping labor
supply.
This way of modeling the economy raises three points. First, as recog-
nized by Canto, Joines, and Laffer, if transfers are given to individuals
other than those who pay taxes, and if individuals have different prefer-
ences, then income effects do not necessarily cancel. Second, if a govern-
ment does nothing other than place a distorting wedge into the labor/
leisure choice of homogeneous consumers and then return revenues in191 Tax Rates and Government Revenue
lump-sum fashion, it necessarily follows that output and welfare would
both fall. These authors have not allowed for any positive contribution of
a government budget. Their model does not account for the income effect
of an efficiency gain that can be associated with correcting market failure
by providing a public good. Third, they fail to allow for any com-
plementarity between private and public outputs. Clearly there are public
goods such as police protection and transportation systems which act to
encourage private production. This complementarity may more than
offset the adverse effects of the necessary tax wedge. Thus the "balanced
budget" labor supply curve does not have to be upward sloping as these
authors insist.
These shortcomings in the Canto, Joines, and Laffer theoretical model
are not explicitly corrected in our model. By allowing the labor supply
elasticity to take on positive or negative values, however, our model does
implicitly take these considerations into account.
We said, above, that no one has used an economic model to estimate
the shape of an entire Laffer curve. However, several empirical studies
have sought to determine whether some specific tax is being operated at a
point where a decrease in tax rates would lead to an increase in revenue
collections. For example, Ronald Grieson et al. find the possibility of an
inverse relationship between tax rates and revenues for local government
in New York: "The inclusion of state taxes lost when economic activity
leaves both the city and state would . . . raise the possibility of a net
revenue loss as a result of an increase in business income taxes" (1977,
p. 179). They find that the nonmanufacturing sector has fewer alterna-
tives to the New York City location and should be taxed more heavily
relative to the manufacturing sector, whose response to tax is more
elastic. Grieson (1980) finds that this relationship between the two sectors
is reversed for Philadelphia, where the nonmanufacturing sector is under
greater competitive pressure. As for Philadelphia's position on its own
Laffer curve, Grieson finds that "Philadelphia may have been at or very
close to the revenue maximizing point . . . before the recent income tax
increase, which raises the possibility of it having been in excess of the
socially optimal one" (p. 135).
Why a local government might find itself in or close to the prohibitive
range of tax rates is not difficult to understand. When a government
serves a very small geographic area, and when transportation out of the
area is inexpensive, then the possibility of migration can result in very
high factor supply elasticities.
Perverse revenue effects are more likely from selective tax cuts than
from general tax cuts, if the selective cuts can be directed at individuals or
activities that are unusually sensitive to tax rates. Hausman (1983) simu-
lates tax cuts separately for husbands and for wives. He does not find that
tax rates are in the prohibitive range, but he does find that tax cuts for192 Chapter Ten
wives result in a smaller loss of revenue because wives exhibit higher
labor supply elasticity. Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki find that capital
realizations are very sensitive to the effective tax rate: "An important
implication of this high coefficient is that a reduction in the tax rate on
capital gains would actually increase the total revenue collected" (1980,
p. 786). Two points serve to mitigate the strength of this result. First, a
capital gains tax cut might unlock a flood of realizations in the short run,
without necessarily increasing revenues in the long run. Second, the
capital gains tax cut is likely to increase corporate-retained earnings,
decrease the dividends paid out, and thus reduce personal tax revenue
from dividends.
The general impression one gets from these empirical studies is that
taxes on individual sectors, or small geographic areas, or special groups
may be in or close to the prohibitive range. For particular economic
activities with high elasticities, tax rates approach the prohibitive range
sooner than they would elsewhere in the economy.
One study that deals with the United States as a whole is the study by
Canto, Joines, and Webb (1979). They evaluate the 1964 tax cuts, which
included the reduction of the top marginal rate in the personal income tax
from 91 percent to 70 percent. They determine that it was equally likely
that the Kennedy tax cuts may have increased or decreased revenues. For
Sweden, Charles Stuart (1981) finds tax rates in the prohibitive range.
Using a fairly simple two-sector model, he concludes that Sweden's
current 80 percent marginal tax rate exceeds the revenue-maximizing
rate. Thus, we have a reason for perverse revenue behavior other than
high elasticities for particular economic activities. In these studies, per-
verse revenue effects are explained by particularly high tax rates.
4
10.3 Another Simple Curve
We have stressed that this debate focuses on high marginal tax rates,
high factor supply elasticities, or a combination of both. By emphasizing
the large incentive effect of tax cuts, the "supply siders" imply that they
believe the relevant elasticities are large. The entire debate reduces to the
empirical matter of determining the relevant parameter values. If supply
elasticities are high enough, the economy could be in the prohibitive
range.
The very location of Laffer's curve in the rate-revenue space of figure
10.1 depends on the supply elasticity of the factor being taxed. If that
4. Other themes from this literature include minimum wage laws, regulation of business,
nonmarket activity, and the complexity of tax rules. The Laffer curve itself focuses on tax
rates, however, so this chapter will consider different tax rates and assume unchanged
complexity. The relevant elasticity for this exercise would provide not just the response of































Elasticities, tax rates, and the Laffer curve.
elasticity were fairly low, the total revenue maximizing point would be at
a high tax rate for that factor, and the converse. One can imagine a third
dimension on that diagram giving different elasticity values. The hill
would then be converted into a ridge, running from a low tax rate and
high elasticity combination to a high rate and low elasticity pair. The crest
of that ridge is plotted in figure 10.2. Everything to the southwest of that
curve signifies the normal area, where raising rates increases revenue,
and northeast of the curve is the prohibitive area, where no rational
government would knowingly operate. Each point on the curve shows the
tax rate that maximizes total revenue for a given elasticity.
Suppose, for a simple example, that homogeneous labor L is taxed at
the proportional rate t. Labor demand and supply are based, respec-
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Setting equation (10.3) equal to zero, we have three equations that can be
solved for w, L, and the revenue-maximizing tax rate t. Since Ls= Ld in
this partial equilibrium system, we can use equations (10.1) and (10.2) to
express w as a function of t. Substituting that w back into equation (10.1),
we can also express L as a function of t. Differentiating these expressions,
substituting into equation (10.3), and solving for t, we have:
5
5. Equation (10.4) is derived somewhat differently in Blinder 1981.194 Chapter Ten
(10.4) t =
If ed > -1 (demand is inelastic), then higher tax rates can always achieve
more revenue. If ed < —1, however, then the relationship between t and
e^ will look like figure 10.2:
_ 1 /1 _i_ ^ .\
< 0, and
ed
so the curve slopes down and is convex to the origin. The easiest case to
see is where ed = — °° so that t = 1/(1 + es). Then the revenue-
maximizing rate approaches one as es goes to zero (inelastic supply), and
it approaches zero as e5 becomes infinite (infinitely elastic supply).
6
In summary, those who find an inverse relationship between tax rates
and revenues must believe that the relevant elasticity is high, that the
relevant tax rate is high, or both. Those who find a normal range must
believe that one or both of these parameters is low. Finally, those who
deny the existence of an inverse relationship at any tax rate might really
just believe that the uncompensated supply elasticity is zero or negative
(or that demand is inelastic).
7
10.4 Estimation of Laffer Curves
Supply side advocates refer to several different types of taxes when
they claim an inverse relationship between a particular tax rate and
government revenue. The curve in figure 10.2 could be plotted by varying
a product tax rate against the price elasticity of demand for that product,
or by plotting capital tax rates against the elasticity of savings with respect
to the net-of-tax return to capital.
Over forty simulations were performed in seeking a prohibitive area
for capital taxes. Using the dynamic version of the model, tax rates were
6. Several points are manifest. First, this analysis oversimplifies by using a given elastic-
ity for all tax rates to find the revenue-maximizing point. As the tax rate varies, so would
equilibrium prices, incomes, and preference parameters like the factor supply elasticity.
Second, a given time frame is implied since elasticities might increase as more time is
allowed for adjustment. Third, neither elasticities nor tax rates have to be positive. The
southwest quadrant contains a symmetrical curve showing the maximum revenue loss from
a subsidy. Finally, note that similar analyses can be performed with respect to ed, the labor
demand elasticity.
7. A zero uncompensated elasticity can mask a high compensated elasticity, however.
Hausman (1981) points out that while the former is relevant to determine actual factor
supply (and thus the tax base and revenues), the latter is relevant for the efficiency cost of
distortions.195 Tax Rates and Government Revenue
raised to 83 percent of gross capital income, savings elasticities were
increased to 4.0, and equilibria were calculated out fifty years in the
future. Normally, discount rate problems arise in determining whether
the present value of revenues has increased or decreased. In this case,
however, not a single period of the raised-tax sequence of equilibria had
lower revenues than the corresponding period of the benchmark se-
quence. Inverse relationships may exist for high effective rates of tax on
certain types of real capital income for certain individuals. No overall
inverse relationship was discovered in this model, however, because the
tax distortion applies to the savings decision, while savings are only an
increment to the capital tax base. More than fifty years would be required
for the tax base reduction to offset a tax rate increase and result in lower
revenues. For this reason, the example used here is the labor tax against
the labor supply elasticity.
In our basic model, the tax on labor used by industry averages 10
percent of net factor payments. The personal income tax takes another
24.9 percent of marginal labor income, weighting the twelve marginal tax
rates by labor income of each group. The total wedge thus takes 31.8
percent of marginal labor income gross of all tax.
8 This overall marginal
rate is the relevant single parameter for summarizing incentive effects in
the model, and this is the parameter varied in simulations for the horizon-
tal axes of figures 10.1 and 10.2. The overall average rate is 19.2 percent,
dividing total labor taxes by gross labor income.
Marginal tax rates determine incentives, but average tax rates by
definition determine revenues. A more progressive tax structure will
therefore attain an earlier revenue maximum. For this reason, progres-
sivity should not be altered in simulating alternative tax rates. Unfortu-
nately, however, there is no unambiguous measure of progressivity.
Simulations in this chapter will hold constant the first of three possible
progressivity measures defined in Musgrave and Musgrave (1980). The
effect of this selection is that the same number of percentage points are
added to or subtracted from all average and marginal labor tax rates of all
consumers when a rate change is simulated. Such changes are summa-
rized by referring to changes in the 31.8 percent overall marginal rate on
gross labor income. Thus labor tax rate changes can be thought of as
changes in the proportional payroll tax rate or as changes in all average
and marginal personal tax rates, on labor income only.
8. The model defines labor income as net of the 10 percent factor tax on industries, but
gross of the personal income tax on individuals. For a marginal dollar of this labor income,
$1.10 is the gross-of-tax payment, $.10 is the payroll tax, and $.249 is the marginal personal
tax paid, averaged over the twelve groups. The total marginal tax rate is thus (.1 +
.249)/1.10, which equals 31.8 percent except for rounding. By the same formula for
different groups, personal marginal rates between 1 percent and 40 percent imply total
marginal rates between (.1 + .01)/1.10, which equals 10 percent, and (.1 + .4)/1.10, which
equals 45.5 percent.196 Chapter Ten
Government transfers are modeled as lump-sum payments to con-
sumer groups in proportion to their observed 1973 receipts from Social
Security, unemployment compensation, food stamps, and other welfare
programs. We recognize that supply side advocates may prefer to model
these payments as additional work disincentives, increasing the wedge
between labor's marginal product and leisure's implicit price. Though
lawmakers probably do not intend to subsidize leisure, some programs
have that effect. The incentive depends on the program's ability to isolate
important characteristics such as age, disability, and number of depen-
dents who make the recipient unable to work. If this intention is success-
ful, the payments will not have a substitution effect. The income effect of
transfer programs could also reduce labor supply, but this effect is cap-
tured in the model.
9
The 1973 data set shows total tax revenue of $362.54 billion. Because of
the parameter calibration procedures described in chapter 6, this amount
of revenue will be collected in the first period of any base-case sequence,
so long as tax rates are unchanged. Simulations with labor tax rates other
than 31.8 percent will have revenues that depend on the elasticity, and it
becomes necessary to specify the disposition of extra revenues. One
possibility is simply to allow a budget surplus or deficit. If a surplus
implies lower future taxes, however, individuals may react to an effective
tax rate different from the specified rate for the simulation. Higher
revenues must eventually be spent or returned. A second possibility is to
increase public expenditures on the nineteen industry outputs of the
model. Though government spending has no macroeconomic effects on
inflation or unemployment in this model, it does have a microeconomic
effect on the pattern of demands for commodities. It indirectly affects the
demand for capital and labor through the different factor ratios of pro-
duction. Instead, we return additional revenues to consumers in lump-
sum fashion, in proportion to their original after-tax incomes.
1
0
9. The difference between paying people who don't work and paying people not to work
is the difference between a marginal payment with incentive effects and a lump-sum
payment. Legally, an employee must be laid off to be eligible for unemployment compensa-
tion. A worker can ask to be laid off, but employers may be reluctant to circumvent the
intent of the law. These transfers are not automatically and fully available to nonworkers.
Similarly, AFDC payments are designed to select recipients by particular characteristics,
maximizing the lump-sum effect and minimizing disincentive effects. Social Security pay-
ments are higher for the blind or disabled. Finally note that these transfers, to the extent that
they are disincentives, do not always apply to marginal hours. Most individuals who take an
extra hour of leisure do not become eligible for transfers at all. Laffer (1980) is correct,
however, that if transfer payments include a means test, work disincentives can be large for
some individuals.
10. This lump-sum rebate has no direct effect on prices since no tax rates are altered. It
could have an indirect effect on prices of the simulated equilibrium, however, since
consumers include the income in their expanded budgets for purchase of commodities and
leisure according to their own preference patterns. This disposition of revenues corresponds
exactly to that of Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1978), reviewed in section 10.2. By symmetry, a
decrease in revenue is accompanied by a lump-sum charge on consumers in the same197 Tax Rates and Government Revenue
The results from over sixty simulations are summarized in table 10.1.
The first column shows the total revenue resulting from different labor
tax rates using the basic model's value of. 15 for the labor supply elasticity
with respect to the net-of-tax wage. The "observed" total revenue of
$362.54 billion corresponds to the basic tax rate of 31.8 percent, and total
revenues are positively related to tax rates, up to a tax that is 70.0 percent
of gross labor income. Beyond that rate, revenues start to fall.
Like Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1978), this model ignores production-
encouraging aspects of any public goods made possible through increased
revenue. As a result, national income (GNP) falls by $223 billion when
the elasticity is .15 and the tax rate is raised to 70.0 percent. Though the
return to the fixed capital stock rises, labor supply falls off by 30 percent.
The gross-of-tax wage rises, but the net-of-tax wage falls in the new
equilibrium. If the increased leisure is valued at the net-of-tax wage, then
the $223 billion income fall is offset by a $173 billion leisure gain, with $50
billion net loss in real terms. These calculations use the geometric mean
of the Paasche and Laspeyres price indexes.
Any column of data from table 10.1 can be used to plot an example of
figure 10.1, as was done in figure 10.3 for the .15 elasticity. In any of these
Laffer curve diagrams, the actual 1973 U.S. economy is represented by
.318 on the labor tax rate axis. If the various tax rates, transfers, and
elasticities are reasonable as modeled, then the U.S. economy is well
down the normal range of the curve. For those who prefer a high elastic-
ity, figure 10.4 plots another Laffer curve. The 4.0 labor supply elasticity
and current tax rates place the United States well onto the prohibitive
range.
In the 4.0 elasticity case, even the small jump from a 31.8 percent labor
tax rate to a 34.7 percent rate causes an 8 percent fall in labor supply, a
$65 billion reduction in national income, a $45 billion increase in the
value of leisure, and a net welfare loss of $20 billion in real terms. A small
tax cut with this high elasticity results in symmetrical increases in labor
supply, output, and welfare. All tax cuts increase welfare in this model
because revenue is replaced with lump-sum charges as in Canto, Joines,
and Laffer (1978). Such opportunities may not in fact be available.
Underlined in each column of table 10.1 is the maximum revenue point
for that elasticity. These tax rate and elasticity combinations correspond
to points on a curve like figure 10.2. When plotted for this example, the
curve is shown in figure 10.5. On this curve, with tax rates as modeled, the
labor supply elasticity would have to be at least 3.0 to put the United
States over the peak and into the prohibitive range. Alternatively, if the
supply elasticity were at least 1.0 and the true overall tax rate were at least
proportions. Total government tax revenues are denned to be inclusive of income returned
to consumers, and exclusive of any lump-sum charges necessary to keep government
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46.4 percent, then again U.S. taxes could be operating irrationally. The
continuum of figure 10.5 allows the reader to select a plausible tax rate
and elasticity combination to determine whether the United States is now
in the prohibitive area. We must say, however, that our knowledge of
labor supply behavior leads us to believe that it is extremely unlikely that
the United States is now operating in the prohibitive range of tax rates.
1
1
11. See chapter 6 for our review of the literature on labor supply elasticities.201 Tax Rates and Government Revenue
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Combinations of elasticities and tax rates that generate max-
imum revenue.
10.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we considered a number of analytical and empirical
arguments about the relationship between tax rates and government
revenues. Using our general equilibrium model we were able to plot this
relationship for a variety of values of the labor supply elasticity. We
found that the U.S. economy could conceivably be operating in the
prohibitive range for taxes on labor, but that reasonable estimates of an
aggregate labor supply elasticity and of an overall marginal labor tax rate
are both low enough to suggest that broad-based cuts in labor tax rates
would not increase revenues.
The tax rate and elasticity relationship can be applied to other federal,
state, or local taxes to find circumstances where a particularly high tax
rate on real income or a particularly high elasticity could place a tax in the
prohibitive area. A tax on purely nominal capital gains, for example, or
an underallowance for depreciation can result in high effective tax rates
on some types of real capital income. Future research could investigate
the responsiveness of these particular investments to high effective rates.
The "marriage penalty," which places a secondary worker in the higher
marginal tax bracket of his or her spouse, may represent another high
rate of tax on an elastically supplied factor.
1
2 Welfare programs that make
recipients ineligible at a given income level imply effective marginal tax
12. Feenberg and Rosen (1983) simulate the effects of four proposals to reduce or
eliminate the marriage penalty. Each has its own welfare effects and redistributions, but
none imply higher revenue.202 Chapter Ten
rates of 100 percent or higher. Also, the high elasticity argument is
particularly applicable for state and local governments since factors are
generally more mobile within national boundaries. McGuire and Rap-
ping (1968,1970) find labor supply elasticities of 20 to 100 for particular
states or industries. This mobility implies that one jurisdiction cannot
charge higher tax rates than its neighbors and may apply increasingly to
international factor flows.
Finally, though the results of this chapter tend to reject the notion of an
inverse relationship between major U.S. tax rates and government rev-
enues, they do not necessarily invalidate the claim that these tax rates and
revenues should be lowered. Even on the normal range, taxes may be
higher than desired by voters. Preferences can change over time, fewer
public goods may now be demanded, and the electorate can legitimately
request a tax decrease. Though incentive effects can still be important
without perverse revenue effects, the point is that the economics of the
tax revolt are less the economics of incentive effects and more the
economics of public choice.